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TAMÁS NÓTÁRI * 
 
The Scales as the Symbol of Justice in the Iliad 
 
Abstract. The idiom of the scales of justice is commonly known and widely used. Iustitia 
can frequently be seen in different representations holding scales in her hand. The scales as a 
means or a symbol of justice (justness) or the administration of justice can be encountered in 
various places in Greek literature, one of its earliest instances being the Homeric Hermes’ 
Hymn (Dikés talanta). According to these loci Zeus holds the scales of Diké, that is to say, 
the scales of justice in his hand. In the Iliad (23, 109–213) one may come across a scene 
presented in context, thus suitable for being more amply analysed, in which Zeus is 
pronouncing justice over the heroes using a pair of scales. In search of the meaning of Dikés 
talanta, this study tries to clarify the concept of law and justice (justness) in Homeric epic 
(I.), then by a structural (II.) and comparative analysis (III.) of certain lines of the weighing 
scene, decisive in the combat of Achilles and Hector, it formulates a few remarks on the 
origin and meaning of the concept of the scales of justice. 
 One cannot claim that this idea of Egyptian religion had been transferred in its entirety 
into Greek thinking, but it is not surprising, as one can barely encounter an unaltered 
Egyptian borrowing in Greek mythological thinking. Nonetheless, some Egyptian influence, 
possibly with Cretan transmission, can be detected in the development of the Greek versions 
of psykhostasia and kerostasia. Pictorial as well as textual manifestations of such influence 
can be found on the one hand in vase-paintings, and on the other hand–undergoing a specific 
alteration of aspect in the form of kerostasia–in Homer, who paved the way for the scales of 
justice of Zeus and Iuppiter to become the symbol of Diké and Iustitia, and subsequently of 
the administration of justice itself. 
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The idiom of the scales of justice is well-known, its use is widely spread, 
Iustitia can frequently be seen with scales in her hand in different represen-
tations.1 The scales as the symbol of justice and administration of justice 
can be encountered in various places in Greek literature, one of its earliest 
instances can be found in the Homeric Hermes’s Hymn (Dikés talanta).2 Then, 
to mention only a few examples, this picture can be detected in Bakkhylides,3 
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 1 Cf. Lange, H.: Die Wörter Aequitas und Iustitia auf römischen Münzen. Zeitschrift 
der Savigny Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichts, Romanistische Abteilung, 60 (1940) 296. sqq. 
 2 Rademacher, L.: Der Homerische Hermeshymnus. Wien, 1931. 213. 
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while in Theognis4 Zeus is measuring out richness and poverty with the help of 
a pair of scales. According to these loci Zeus is holding in his hand the scales 
of Diké.5 In the Iliad one can encounter a scene presented in context, thus 
suitable for being more amply analysed, in which Zeus is pronouncing justice 
over the heroes using a pair of scales. Searching for the meaning of Dikés 
talanta this paper will first try to clarify the concept of law and justice as it 
appears in the Homeric epic (I.), then, by the structural (II.) and comparative 
(III.) analysis of some lines of the weighing scene, decisive in the combat of 
Achilles and Hector, some remarks will be made on the origin and meaning of 
the concept of the scales of justice 
 
 
I. The word diké is traditionally derived from the root *deik of the verb 
deiknymi (to show, to point at, to explain, to testify); its basic meaning of 
direction, way, custom is completed with the meanings customary procedure, 
decision, resolution, trial, and law.6 (These two meanings, traditonally derived 
from each other are approached from a new aspect by Palmer, according to 
whom the meaning of signalling, custom, characteristic, particularity and the 
meaning decision, resolution, of the word diké, originally the borderline drawn 
between two litigant parties derived from the root *deik, developed parallelly, 
independently from each other so neither of these can be considered secondary, 
derived from the other.7) The primary meaning of the word diké–or in any case 
the one mentioned first–(generally in genitival and adverbial constructions) 
frequently occurs in the Odyssey as a quality, a particularity, a way of be-
haviour characteristic of a given group of people.8 It is also worth scrutinizing 
the other meaning of the word diké, which can be performed together with the 
examination of the verb dikadzein and the adjective dikaspolos.9 In this sense 
diké originally signifies a border or a dividing line, most often dividing two 
plots of land, which constitute the object of two persons’ claims of ownership. 
  
 4 Theogn. 157. 
 5 Aisch. Ag. 250; Pers. 345. sk; Hik. 822. Cf. E. Wüst: Die Seelenwägung in Ägypten 
und Griechenland. Archiv für Religionswissenschaft, 36 (1939) 166. 
 6 Gonda, J.: ΔΕΙΚΝΥΜΙ: Semantische Studie over den Indo-Germanische Wortel DEIK. 
Amsterdam, 1929. 224. sqq.; Gagarin, M.: „Diké” in the „Works and Days”. Classical 
Philology, 68 (1973) 82. 
 7 Palmer, L. R.: The Indo-European Origins of Greek Justice. TPhS Oxford, 1950. 
157. sqq. 
 8 Od. 4, 690–692; 11, 216–218; 14, 58–60; 18, 274–275; 19, 43; 19, 67–70; 24, 254–255. 
 9 Gagarin: „Diké” in the „Works and Days”. op. cit. 83. 
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Naturally, this borderline can be either straight or curved,10 the meaning of the 
word diké, determining, dividing the parts of the litigants in a legal process, 
and thus deciding the matter of dispute, possibly developed from this fact.11 If 
they did not want to decide the dispute between two persons over a certain 
issue (over property, or over the blood money to be paid for the murder of a 
relative etc.) by violence (bié) but by way of peaceful decision (diké), but they 
could not reach a solution, which would satisfy both parties they could make 
appeal to an objective third person, who was not interested in the case, to make 
a proposal (dikadzein) for deciding the dispute. They could agree to solve their 
contradiction (dikaspolos) according to the opinion of a single person, or they 
could ask different persons for proposals for decision, and then to end the dispute 
by yielding to the solution most acceptable for both of them. So diké was the 
proposal for decision, at the same time diké was the whole contradictory 
process itself, although the society of the Homeric epoch probably did not 
know the compulsive force to constrain the individual to subject himself to 
diké.12 Two descriptions of such a procedure, in which, as the sources also 
demonstrate it, the oath naturally played an important role as well, can be found 
in Homer: one connected to the argument between Antilochus and Menelaus 
following the chariot race, risen over the primacy and the reward in the contest,13 
the second description of the legal procedure occurs in the description of 
Achilles’s shield in the Iliad.14 As it becomes evident especially from the 
second locus the straightest diké does not necessarily have to coincide with 
the claims of either party–which might seem surprising at first sight because 
in the legal cultures based on Roman law a legal process had to end either with 
acquittal or condemnation15–because the essence of the Homeric trial most 
probably consisted of finding and implementing the most acceptable compromise 
with the help of the dikai.16 Whenever the verb dikadzein occurs in the active 
in the Iliad and the Odyssey,17 it always means deciding a certain case, its 
medial form dikadzesthai means the dispute, or representing a concrete case in 
  
 10 Palmer: op. cit. 159. 
 11 Gagarin: „Diké” in the „Works and Days”. op. cit. 83; Gagarin, M.: Diké in the 
Archaic Greek Thought. Classical Philology, 69 (1974) 187. 
 12 Bonner, R. J.–Smith, G.: The Administration of Justice from Homer to Aristotle I. 
Chicago 1930. 46. sqq.; Gagarin: „Diké” in the „Works and Days”. op. cit. 83. 
 13 Il. 23, 540–554; 566–586. 
 14 Il. 18, 497–508. 
 15 Cf. Földi A.–Hamza G.: A római jog története és institúciói (History and Istitutes of 
Roman Law). Budapest, 2005. 153. 
 16 Gagarin: „Diké” in the „Works and Days”. op. cit. 85. 
 17 Il. 1, 540–543; 8, 427–431; Od. 11, 547. 
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the course of the dispute,18 the expression dikaspolos can be encountered in the 
sense of sentence passing judge.19 The basic interpretation of diké, meaning 
decision is corroborated by the Homeric loci, which designate diké as the 
portion to which somebody is lawfully entitled,20 at the same time, elsewhere it 
designates the legal process itself, the solving of particular contradictions 
peacefully,21 by way of legal disputes, in other places it signifies a whole chain 
of decisions, possibly the legal procedure en général.22 Two further loci23 
testify that diké in the singular could mean a lawful procedure, a peaceful 
judgement.24 (As two basic meanings of the word diké are differentiated, this 
can also be done in the case of the adjective dikaios and the adverb dikaiós, 
in most cases meaning proper conduct, in accordance with custom, or, in the 
negative meaning deviation from accepted behaviour,25 in some cases how-
ever, they designate lawful,26 rule following procedure.27) 
 At the same time, Diké as a divine being is Zeus’s daughter as well, thus 
being a so-called Person-Bereich Einheit, partaking of a certain kind of 
abstraction as well. The Person-Bereich thinking was for the ancient man a 
specific way of experiencing things in the course of which he experienced 
some physical reality (an object, a process or a state), and, at the same time, 
he experienced it also as a divine being.28 The thing and the divinity was 
designated by the same concept. Sometimes–because antique writing did not 
differentiate between the maiuscula and the minuscula–it causes great difficulty 
in textual tradition to decide whether to write fortuna or Fortuna in a given 
instance. Naturally, either form is preferred, the other is tacitly part of the 
concept and should be taken into account as well. Designating a concept with 
identical words would outwardly suggest juxtaposition, but in fact it shows the 
unity of the person and the field represented or function fulfilled by him or her, 
  
 18 Od. 11, 543–546; 12, 437–441. 
 19 Il. 1, 232–239; Od. 11, 184–187. 
 20 Il. 19, 179–180. 
 21 Il. 16, 541–543; Od. 11, 568–571. 
 22 Od. 3, 244. 242–245. 
 23 Il. 16, 384–388; Od. 14, 83–84. 
 24 Gagarin: „Diké” in the „Works and Days”. op. cit. 85–86. 
 25 Od. 3, 52. 133; 14, 90; 18, 275; 18, 414 = 20, 322; 6, 120 = 8, 575 = 9, 175 = 13, 
201; 20, 294 = 21, 312. 
 26 Il. 11, 832; 13, 6; 19, 181. 
 27 Cf. Gagarin: „Diké” in the „Works and Days”. op. cit. 86; Gagarin: Diké in the 
Archaic… op. cit. 188. 
 28 Pötscher, W.: Person-Bereichdenken und Personifikation. Literatur–Wissenschaft-
liches Jahrbuch, 19 (1978) 229. 
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in which one or the other aspect comes to the fore.29 (It is problematic though, 
to what extent can the cult be considered a crucial proof of the fact that the 
given divinity was also experienced as a person, or, more precisely the lack of 
a cult does not prove that the personal component was missing from the given 
divinity. It is a widespread opinion that if a god did not have a cult, it is only 
an impersonal power, mana, thus belonging not so much to the religious 
sphere but rather to the magical one.30 Undoubtedly, the widespread cult with 
prayers, sacrifices, clergy and temples is a definite proof of a personal god-
image. However, the cult is not the only possible form of expressing religious 
veneration and it is a question whether there was any need to consecrate separate 
temples for the gods who were experienced spectacularly and with intensive 
emotions. At the same time, in the case of certain gods, who were experienced 
by the Greeks and Romans as Person-Bereich Einheit, the cult was considerably 
widespread, e.g Zeus, who had been originally the Indo-European God of Sky 
and Rain, or the river Tiber–with the cultic name Tiberinus–or Ares.31) 
 
 
II. In the following I would like to expound briefly on the development of 
Greek soul-weighing in order to highlight the importance of scales in the 
course of the legal process. The dramatic climax of the twenty-second song of 
the Iliad is the description of Hector’s death. The heroes Achilles and Hector, 
preparing for the final combat have already gone round the Greek camp three 
times, then, when they reach the well for the fourth time, the following 
happens before the final combat ending in Hector’s death takes place: 
 
Καì τóτε δ χρúσεια πατρ τíταινε τáλαϖτα, 
ϖ δè τíθει δúο κρε τανϕλεγéοϖ θανáτοιο, 
τν μèν Αχιλλοϖ, τν δ Εκτοροϖ πποδáμοιο, 
λκε δè μéσσα λαβẃν? 
éπε δ Εκτοροϖ ασιμον μαρ, 
χετο δ εϖ Αḯδαο λíπεν δé  Φοβοϖ Απóλλων.32 
 
The scene is completely picture-like and unambiguous, it is only the dyo kére, 
measured by Zeus, i.e. the expression two kére that needs futher explana-
  
 29 Pötscher, W.: Das Person-Bereichdenken in der frühgriechischen Periode. Wiener 
Studien, 72 (1959) 24. 
 30 Pötscher: Das Person-Bereichdenken… op. cit. 26. 
 31 Pötscher: Person-Bereichdenken und Personifikation. op. cit. 219. 
 32 Il. 22, 209–213. 
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tion.33 The view according to which kér would only mean dead soul, was 
categorically refuted by Malten. Malten, deriving kér from kéraion, calls it a 
harmful spirit, a malefic demon (Schadegeist).34 He does not connect it directly 
with the human soul, but he regards it as a general destructive force that can 
manifest itself in the form of a god, a human or an animal,35 according to the 
given situation.36 Similarly, the opinion according to which the kér would be 
only the synonim for human soul, psykhé is untenable, because comparing 
the description with pictorial representations to be discussed later, one can see 
that when in the vase-pictures Zeus is measuring the little figures representing 
the souls (psykhai) with the scales, the result of the measuring is contrary to 
the one known from the Iliad, namely the scale pan with the winner’s soul 
descends and the one with the loser’s soul ascends.37 The idea that Zeus would 
measure malefic gods or harmful demons with the scales is likewise to be 
discarded, because although this meaning of Kére can be found elsewhere,38 
the deities are always powerful beings,39 so it would seem absurd to measure 
their ability to destroy a man or a heros.40 I think that we can find a plausible 
explanation for the conceptual pair Kér/kér in the idea of Person-Bereich Einheit. 
How is the Person-Bereich Einheit represented in this case? The Kér/kér means 
at the same time a destructive, harmful god (godess) as its personal component 
and it also includes its material aspects, i. e. a mortal force or energy. The 
human soul attacked by the deity Kér, also became kér, a substance permeated 
by destructive power, infected by corruption. So Zeus, in the course of the 
kerostasia, is placing onto the scales the souls who became possessed by Kér, 
and thus were transformed into kér themselves.41 
 The kerostasia found in Homer–ultimately the weighing of souls transformed 
into kér–is based on a much earlier belief about soul-measuring, which becomes 
evident from the following. We have knowledge of a tragedy by Aeschylus 
entitled Psykhostasia and we have numerous vase-pictures on which we can 
see Zeus and Hermes placing souls onto scales. The Homeric epic gives a vivid 
  
 33 Roscher, W. H.: Ausführliches Lexikon der griechischen und römischen Mythologie 
II. Leipzig, 1884–1937. 1136. sqq. 
 34 Malten, L.: Ker. RE Suppl. 4. 883. sqq. 
 35 Il. 18, 115=22, 365; Il. 2, 352; 5, 652.=11, 443; Il. 3, 6. 
 36 Dietrich, B. C.: The Judgement of Zeus. Rheinisches Museum, 1964. 103. sqq. 
 37 Pötscher, W.: Schicksalswägungen. Kairos, 15 (1973) 61. 
 38 Il. 12, 326.  
 39 Il. 18, 534. 
 40 Pötscher: Schicksalswägungen. op. cit. 61. 
 41 Pötscher, W.: Moira, Themis und timé im homerischen Denken. Wiener Studien, 73 
(1960) 15. sqq. 
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description of the ideas that the ancient Greeks had of the human soul. The 
Odyssey calls the dead amenéna karéna42 because they lack menos, the vitality 
characteristic of the living. The souls of the dead are flying about like bats,43 
they cannot be touched, just like shadows or dreams,44 and the psykhé is flying 
away like a bird.45 Archeological findings also corroborate this. The more ancient 
vase-paintings using black figures represent the human soul almost exclusively 
as a little winged figure, or, in some cases, without a wing.46 The transfor-
mation of kerostasia into psykhostasia only indicates the changing of the 
aspect of measuring. While in the course of psykhostasia it is the scale pan of 
the soul possessing more menos, thus being more powerful, more vital that 
descends and the scale pan of the loser, the weaker part ascends, in kerostasia 
this happens the other way round, because the soul penetrated with kér to a 
greater extent possesses less menos, it is precisely the lack of vital power that 
signifies the power and greatness of the destructive force (or, to use psycho-
logical terms, it shows how the death instinct overpowers the life instinct). The 
fact that the scale pan containing the soul condemned to die descends is also 
explained by the localization of Hades, the underworld.47 
 In order to render the idea complete–and hopefully to clear up some 
misbeliefs–here I would like to make some remarks on the role of Fate in 
Homeric thinking. Moira means part, share48–Nielsson observes that the 
essence of the concept is given by the translation portion (Portion), because in 
time the concepts part (Teil) and share (Anteil) became somewhat abstract, 
though in the beginning they did not possess such abstract meaning. This is 
also shown by the loci of the Iliad and the Odyssey,49 where moira appears 
with the following meanings among others: a part of a god’s rule over the 
world,50 a given period of time,51 the share received from the prey,52 a portion 
  
 42 Od. 10, 521. 
 43 Od. 24, 5. sqq. 
 44 Od. 11, 205. 
 45 Il. 16, 856; 22, 362. 
 46 Nielsson, M. P.: Geschichte der griechischen Religion I. München, 1968. 196; 
Waser, O.: Über die äussere Erscheinung der Seele in den Vorstellungen der Völker zumal 
der alten Griechen. Archiv für Religionswissenschaft, 16 (1913) 
 47 Pötscher: Schicksalswägungen. op. cit. 62. 
 48 Nielsson: op. cit. 362. 
 49 Eberling, H.: Lexicon Homericum I–II. Hildesheim, 1963. I. 1113. sqq. 
 50 Il. 15, 195. 
 51 Il. 10, 253. 
 52 Il. 9, 318. 
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at a meal,53 or in the plural it can signify pieces of meat.54 The idea of Fate 
originates in the concrete share of luck (Lebensglück), one person’s moira is 
in close connection with that of another person, therefore the moira did not 
become an abstract concept of destiny. Fate, designated with moira is often 
represented as a person or persons, these are the godesses of Fate, the Moirai. 
Instead of personification it seems more adequate to regard this phenomenon 
as a Person-Bereich Einheit. The Moira/moira is also one of the concepts in 
which the personal and the physical spheres constitute an indivisible unity.55 
Although–as we could see–the presence or absence of the cult does not prove 
the lack of the personal component of the deity, in the case of Moira/moira the 
existence of the cult is proved.56 The number of Moirai is three, which 
originally only meant that several Moirai existed in Greek religious thinking, 
as in a more ancient stage of the Greek language the smallest number that 
could stand in plural, (pluralis) was three due to the fact that in the respective 
period the language was aware of the dual (dualis).57 Later, following the 
pattern of other divine trinities, their number was fixed in three, and the role 
of each person (Klóthó, Lakhesis, Atrópos) came to be precisely determined. 
However, the relationship of the moira and Zeus as well as the moira and other 
gods is more essential and also causing more debate. The views appearing in 
the literature of the subject can be classified in three main groups: While one 
group is placing the moira below Zeus and the other above him, the represen-
tatives of the third group maintain that posing the question of subordination 
and superiority is not in accordance with Greek religious thinking. In their view 
the moira is a heterogeneous concept, perfectly separable from the gods, and 
the fact that the Moirai are godesses themselves did not cause disturbance in 
the Greek mythological world, which was completely lacking a logically 
constructed theological or dogmatic system.58 The gods guarantee order, so 
their role is more active than that of the moira, yet the moira is also a part of 
the order sustained by the gods. Thus in one sense Zeus and the gods stand above 
the moira, because they implement it, but in another respect the Moira/moira 
stands above the gods because it expresses the order that must be implemented 
by the gods. 
  
 53 Od. 3, 66; 8, 470; 14, 448. 
 54 Od. 20, 260. 
 55 Pötscher: Moira, Themis und timé im… op. cit 103. 
 56 Roscher: op. cit. 3089. sqq. 
 57 Kühner, R.–Blass, F.–Gerth, B.: Ausführliche Grammatik der griechischen Sprache 
I–II. Hannover, 1890–1904. 1. 362. 
 58 Nielsson: op. cit. I. 364.  
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III. The vase-pictures representing soul-weighing deserve more attention, in 
these it is Hermes who regularly places the souls of the two heroes Achilles and 
Memnón onto the scales.59 (In some representations Zeus is also present but it is 
not him who performs the weighing. The two heroes can unquestionably be 
identified as Achilles and Memnón because their mothers Thetis and Eos are 
present in order to influence with their prayers the outcome of the weighing 
meant to decide the result of the combat.) The Aeschylean Psykhostasia 
mentioned before also deals with the combat between Achilles and Memnón, 
ending with the former’s victory,60 but here the scales are not in Hermes’s but in 
Zeus’s hands.61 If we take a quick glance at the Egyptian sources we can easily 
find similarities and analogies between Greek and Egyptian psykhostasia.  
 The most mature and most precise description of Egyptian soul-measuring 
can be found in Chapter 125 of the Book of the Dead written in the time of the 
XVIII. dynasty (16th–15th century BC.).62 According to this the other wordly 
judging–and the soul-measuring, constituting the object of the present analysis 
as part of this–was performed in the following way. Osiris sat on a throne in a 
huge hall, the hall of the two Maat-s,63 which was roofed by flames and the 
signs of Justice, in front of him were standing Anubis and the Horus-sons, and 
a beast combining the features of a crocodile, a lion, and a hippopotamus in his 
appearance, which had the task of devouring the defendant eventually found 
guilty in the verdict. The forty-two judges appointed by Osiris were sitting in the 
back of the hall (their number symbolising the number of the districts of Egypt), 
the scales on which the dead person’s heart was to be placed stood in the front 
part of the hall. The Godess of Justice (Maat) received the deceased person 
coming into the hall, whose heart was placed by Horus and Annubis in one of 
the scale-pans–while a feather or an eye was placed in the other (both being 
the symbols of maat)–, then they weighed it to see whether it was lighter than 
justice. If the pointer did not move, the weighing was considered succesful, 
whereas if the pan containing the dead person’s heart ascended, the beast 
devoured the culprit. The result of the weighing was noted down by Thot, the 
divine scribe, who later told it to Osiris. The dead person stepping into the hall 
made a negative confession, i.e. he denied commiting the sins connected to 
the forty-two judges, offending the ethical codex of the Egyptians, and then 
  
 59 Roscher: op. cit. II. 1142. sq.; Wüst: op. cit. 164. sqq. 
 60 Wüst: op. cit. 165. 
 61 Plut. aud. poet. 17a 
 62 Erman, A.: Die ägyptische Religion. Berlin, 1909. 101. sqq.; Spiegel, J.: Die Idee 
vom Totengericht in der ägyptischen Religion. Glückstadt, 1935. 
 63 Morenz, S.: Ägyptische Religion. Stuttgart, 1960. 117. sqq. 
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enumerated the names of the judges.64 (During the confession the deceased 
person wishing to clear himself had to name and to greet the judge connected 
to the respective deed. So, for example he had to state that he did not commit 
injustice, robbery, he did not use force against anyone, did not steal, did not 
kill, and did not instigate anyone to do so. He did not cause damage to the 
temple or the gods, did not take away anything unlawfully from the sacrifices 
destined for them, did not commit adultery, did not fornicate, did not falsify 
the measuring device of grain, did not violate the borders of someone else’s 
land, did not commit false measuring, etc. Naming these circumstances reveals 
a great deal about the ideas of the Egyptians about the maat–which can be 
parallelled from a structural point of view with the Greek themis or diké.) 
 Let us consider now the paralells between the Egyptian Book of the Dead 
and the Greek vase-paintings (disregarding for the moment the fact that scales 
are used in both cases)!65 Both Thot and Hermes fulfill in mythology the role 
of psykhopompos, the guide of souls in the underworld, both of them are so-
called literate gods, at the soul-weighing they are either performing the act or 
playing the role of the scribe. At the process both Osiris and Zeus are present 
as principal gods. It is hardly by accident that both in the vase-pictures and in 
Aeschylus Achilles is confronting Memnón, king of Aithiopia whose homeland 
was believed by Homer to be South-East from the Greeks. Presumably, the 
Greeks originally appropriated the idea of soul-weighing for Achilles’s combat 
with a hero whose homeland was thought to be close to the place where this 
belief had originated, and later–after integrating these elements into their own 
religious world-picture–they used it more freely and with a wider scope.66 
The fact that the symbolism of the scales of justice reached the islands of the 
Aegeian Sea very early, in the years 1500–1200 BC., is proved by archeo-
logical discoveries as well. In a Mycenean grave–excavated by Schliemann–in 
which two women lay buried along with their babies, they found two golden 
scales in good condition. A butterfly can be seen on the upper part of each of 
their pans. Although many experts67 wished to consider these findings only 
articles of personal use, it is probably not over-hasty to draw some further 
conclusions from the symbolism of the scales.68 As it was mentioned per 
tangentem before, the human soul was often represented by the ancient Greeks 
  
 64 Budge, E. A. W.: Egyptian Religion–Egyptian Ideas of the Future Life. London, 
1979. 130. sqq. 
 65 Wüst: op. cit. 167. sqq. 
 66 Wüst: op. cit. 168. 
 67 E.g. Fimmen, D.: Die kretisch-mykenische Kultur. 1924. 124; Wüst: op. cit. 167. 
 68 Diertich: op. cit. 121. 
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as a winged figure. It is not only at the Greeks, but also at the Germans and the 
Albanians that the so-called soul butterfly picture can be encountered.69 On a 
vase found in the Cyprian Encomy, dating from around 1300 BC. according to 
Nielsson, two men are represented, who are standing on a chariot, facing 
another man holding a pair of scales, presumably Zeus.70  
 With all these I naturally do not wish to mingle the Egyptian psykhostasia 
with the Greek one, as the differences between them are obvious. In Egypt the 
soul of every deceased person is placed on the scales of justice, the Greeks do 
so only with the souls of a few exceptional heroes, preparing to fight one another, 
and this happens while they are still alive. The Egyptian idea carries a moral 
content, whereas the Greek one decides and approves the–possibly morally 
justifiable–outcome of the fight.71 It seems worth taking a quick glance at the 
transformations and changes of aspect through which the kerostasia of the 
Iliad reached Roman literature. The most typical example for this can be found 
in the twelveth song of Virgil’s Aeneid where the final combat between Aeneas 
and Turnus is described: “Iuppiter ipse duas aequato examine lances / sustinet 
et fata imponit diversa duorum, / quem damnet labor et quovergat pondere 
letum.”72 The fata of the two persons are placed onto the scale-pans and 
whereas in Homer the reader is informed about the result of the weighing, in 
Virgil we can infer that the outcome was favourable for Aeneas only from the 
events on earth. 
 So we cannot claim that this idea of Egyptian religion would have completely 
been transported into Greek thinking but this is not strange, as we cannot 
encounter any unaltered Egyptian borrowing in Greek mythological thinking.73 
At the same time, some Egyptian influence–possibly with Cretan transmission–
can be detected in the development of the Greek version of psykhostasia. 
The pictorial, as well as the textual proof/manifestation of this influence can be 
found on the one hand in vase-paintings, on the other hand–undergoing a specific 
alteration of aspect, in the form of kerostasia–it can be found in Homer, from 
whom directly leading to Zeus’s and Iuppiter’s scales of justice becoming the 
symbol of Diké and Iustitia, and then the symbol of the administration of 
justice itself. 
  
 69 Waser: op. cit. 337. sqq. 
 70 Nielsson, M. P.: Homer and Mycenae. London, 1933. 267. sqq. 
 71 Cf. Malten, L.: Elysion und Radamanthys. Archäologisches Jahrbuch, 38 (1913) 35. 
sqq. 
 72 Verg. Aen. 12, 725–727. 
 73 Dietrich: op. cit. 114. sqq. 
